skills/bmad-code-org/bmad-module-creative-intelligence-suite/bmad-cis-design-thinking/Gen Agent Trust Hub
bmad-cis-design-thinking
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script at
{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.pyduring activation and completion to handle configuration merging and key resolution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow includes a dynamic instruction execution step in Step 7, where the value of the
on_completeconfiguration key is retrieved and followed as a terminal instruction, allowing for arbitrary agent actions based on local config content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by loading the contents of all files matching the pattern
{project-root}/**/project-context.mdand treating them as 'foundational context' without sanitization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Mandatory Evidence Chain for indirect injection: 1. Ingestion points:
{project-root}/**/project-context.md,{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.toml, and user-provided context data. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not define delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the ingested files. 3. Capability inventory: Subprocess execution viapython3, dynamic following of instructions from configuration, and reading/writing files within the project directory. 4. Sanitization: Absent; no validation, escaping, or filtering is applied to the content of the context files or the resolved terminal instructions.
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