web-scraping-python

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its primary function is to ingest and process untrusted external data from the web.
  • Ingestion points: External URLs fetched via requests.get or Selenium in generated scrapers, and target URLs passed to scripts/new_scraper.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not provide the agent with explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within scraped HTML or documents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network requests (requests), local file writing (save_csv), and the creation of executable files (chmod in new_scraper.py).
  • Sanitization: While data is cleaned for extraction (e.g., stripping HTML tags), there is no sanitization to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions contained within the scraped content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scaffolding utility scripts/new_scraper.py performs a privilege modification.
  • Evidence: It uses output_path.chmod(0o755) to make dynamically generated Python scripts executable on the local filesystem.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill teaches and provides examples for executing code in external environments.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/api_reference.md (Chapter 11) describe using driver.execute_script() in Selenium to run arbitrary JavaScript within a browser context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and suggests the installation of several external third-party libraries.
  • Evidence: scripts/new_scraper.py and various documentation files recommend installing requests, beautifulsoup4, scrapy, and selenium. These are well-known libraries from trusted ecosystems, but they constitute external dependencies.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 12:10 AM