web-scraping-python
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its primary function is to ingest and process untrusted external data from the web.
- Ingestion points: External URLs fetched via
requests.getor Selenium in generated scrapers, and target URLs passed toscripts/new_scraper.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not provide the agent with explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within scraped HTML or documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network requests (
requests), local file writing (save_csv), and the creation of executable files (chmodinnew_scraper.py). - Sanitization: While data is cleaned for extraction (e.g., stripping HTML tags), there is no sanitization to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions contained within the scraped content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scaffolding utility
scripts/new_scraper.pyperforms a privilege modification. - Evidence: It uses
output_path.chmod(0o755)to make dynamically generated Python scripts executable on the local filesystem. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill teaches and provides examples for executing code in external environments.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/api_reference.md(Chapter 11) describe usingdriver.execute_script()in Selenium to run arbitrary JavaScript within a browser context. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and suggests the installation of several external third-party libraries.
- Evidence:
scripts/new_scraper.pyand various documentation files recommend installingrequests,beautifulsoup4,scrapy, andselenium. These are well-known libraries from trusted ecosystems, but they constitute external dependencies.
Audit Metadata