dingtalk-document
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a bash script intended for the agent to execute automatically to perform identifier conversion.
- Evidence: Bash snippet in
SKILL.mdusingcurl,grep, andcutto process API responses and append results to the local config file. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to collect and store high-privilege DingTalk application credentials in a persistent local file.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifies collectingDINGTALK_APP_KEYandDINGTALK_APP_SECRETand storing them in~/.dingtalk-skills/config. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external APIs to retrieve access tokens and document data.
- Evidence: Multiple references and instruction blocks targeting
api.dingtalk.comandoapi.dingtalk.com(Well-known services). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes document content from an external platform without explicit sanitization rules for the text blocks.
- Ingestion points: Document content retrieved via
GET /v1.0/doc/suites/documents/{docKey}/blocksinSKILL.mdandreferences/api.md. - Boundary markers: None specified for the document content processing.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (bash script), file-system writes (
~/.dingtalk-skills/config), and network operations (DingTalk API). - Sanitization: No specific escaping or validation mentioned for the content retrieved from DingTalk nodes.
Audit Metadata