dingtalk-document

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a bash script intended for the agent to execute automatically to perform identifier conversion.
  • Evidence: Bash snippet in SKILL.md using curl, grep, and cut to process API responses and append results to the local config file.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to collect and store high-privilege DingTalk application credentials in a persistent local file.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md specifies collecting DINGTALK_APP_KEY and DINGTALK_APP_SECRET and storing them in ~/.dingtalk-skills/config.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external APIs to retrieve access tokens and document data.
  • Evidence: Multiple references and instruction blocks targeting api.dingtalk.com and oapi.dingtalk.com (Well-known services).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes document content from an external platform without explicit sanitization rules for the text blocks.
  • Ingestion points: Document content retrieved via GET /v1.0/doc/suites/documents/{docKey}/blocks in SKILL.md and references/api.md.
  • Boundary markers: None specified for the document content processing.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (bash script), file-system writes (~/.dingtalk-skills/config), and network operations (DingTalk API).
  • Sanitization: No specific escaping or validation mentioned for the content retrieved from DingTalk nodes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 02:36 AM