agent-comms
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
sendcommand inscripts/agent-msgusestmux send-keysfollowed by an 'Enter' signal. This enables one agent session to execute arbitrary shell commands in any other active tmux session without session-level authorization. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
readcommand inscripts/agent-msgusestmux capture-paneto retrieve the terminal output/history of other sessions. This creates a risk for harvesting sensitive information like API keys, credentials, or environment variables that may have been displayed or logged in those sessions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface. Ingestion points: The
readcommand inscripts/agent-msgingests untrusted terminal content. Boundary markers: No markers are used to delimit external content or warn the agent. Capability inventory: The skill can inject commands (send), read terminal buffers (read), and access filesystem paths (info). Sanitization: Terminal output is retrieved and returned to the agent without any sanitization or filtering.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata