codex-tmux
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
_build_tmux_wrapperfunction inscripts/run.pyperforms unsafe string interpolation of theprefixandsession_namevariables into a Bash script template. Since these values are not escaped usingshlex.quote, providing a malicious prefix (e.g.,$(touch /tmp/pwned)) results in command execution when the wrapper script is run. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The generated script uses
osascriptwith variables derived from the unsanitizedprefix, providing an additional vector for command execution within the system's notification service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Commit messages are read via
git loginscripts/run.py. 2. Boundary markers: No markers or 'ignore' instructions are used for ingested git data. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can write files and execute subprocesses (tmux, git, codex). 4. Sanitization: While commit messages are passed via environment variables to a Python helper, the overall lack of validation for data from the repo context represents an unmitigated attack surface.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata