unclawg-respond
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/uc_respondwrapper script executes external binaries. It searches for and executes a binary namedccurlfrom various system paths and environment variables (e.g.,/home/openclaw/.openclaw/bin/ccurlorOPENCLAW_CCURL). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script supports executing arbitrary commands defined in the
OPENCLAW_SOCIAL_REWRITE_CMDenvironment variable. It passes a JSON payload containing untrusted data (user feedback) to this command's standard input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill retrieves sensitive credentials, including
OPENCLAW_API_KEYandOPENCLAW_MACHINE_SECRET, from various.envfiles and environment variables, transmitting them as headers to the remote API specified byOPENCLAW_API_URL. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted human feedback from an external API and interpolates it into a "rewrite brief" for a model, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Feedback messages are fetched from the
/v0/approval-requests/{approval_id}/messagesendpoint byscripts/uc_respond. - Boundary markers: The prompt construction in
_build_social_rewrite_context_dumpuses markers like<<LATEST_FEEDBACK>>to delimit content. - Capability inventory: The skill can perform network writes to the API and execute local shell commands via the rewrite and networking wrappers.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the feedback content before it is interpolated into the prompt brief.
Audit Metadata