extension-email

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data (email addresses, usernames, and order references) to generate content for outgoing emails, creating a potential surface for indirect injection if these inputs are not sanitized.
  • Ingestion points: The arguments for the sendOrderConfirmationEmail function in src/backend/main.mo.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or ignore-instructions for the interpolated data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the EmailClient.sendServiceEmail tool to transmit the processed content externally.
  • Sanitization: No explicit HTML escaping or input validation is observed in the provided Motoko logic.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the Mops package manager to include functionality from a vendor-controlled module.
  • Dependency: The module mo:caffeineai-email/emailClient is imported to facilitate email operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 03:50 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — extension-email