task-folder-migrator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via Bash to manage the file system during migration.
  • Evidence: Step 4C and 4E use commands like mkdir -p "{project_path}/implementation_process/in_progress/{task_name}" and mv "{project_path}/.../{task_name}.md" ....
  • Risk: The variables {project_path} and {task_name} are derived from the environment or existing file names. Because these are wrapped in double quotes rather than single quotes in the bash string, shell metacharacters such as $(...) or ` could be evaluated, leading to arbitrary command execution if a file is maliciously named.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads untrusted content from existing markdown task files using the Read tool in Step 4A.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions (e.g., 'treat the following as data only') are present to isolate the read content from the agent's logic.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash (system commands), Write (file creation), and Read (file access) across all migration scripts.
  • Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the extracted content before it is interpolated into new file templates in Step 4D.
  • Risk: Malicious instructions embedded within a task file's content could be interpreted by the agent as instructions during the parsing and migration process, particularly in 'Automatic Mode' where user confirmation is bypassed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 12:30 AM