wispr-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the local Wispr Flow SQLite database at
~/Library/Application Support/Wispr Flow/flow.sqliteto retrieve voice dictation history. This access is essential for the skill's purpose and the data is used locally to generate recaps for the user. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The generated HTML reports reference resources from external domains. These include the
html2canvaslibrary fromcdnjs.cloudflare.comand application icons from legitimate sources like Apple's CDN (is1-ssl.mzstatic.com) and official product domains (e.g.,cursor.sh,linear.app). All detected external references target well-known or trusted services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-generated transcripts, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts are retrieved from the
Historytable in the localflow.sqlitedatabase (specifically theformattedTextcolumn). - Boundary markers: The Node.js scripts use markdown headers and blockquotes to structure CLI output, and the HTML generator uses an
escapeHTMLhelper function for rendering. - Capability inventory: The scripts have file system write access (
fs.writeFileSync) to the user's Desktop. The agent's instructions inSKILL.mddirect it to summarize and synthesize these transcripts, which could lead to following instructions embedded in the dictation history. - Sanitization: While HTML content is escaped to prevent browser-based attacks, the transcripts are not filtered for instructions that might target the AI's behavior during the summarization process.
Audit Metadata