ccw

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles shell-like command strings for execution by sub-agents, using untrusted data sources.
  • Evidence: The buildSkillCall function performs direct string interpolation of the user's intent and artifact data (like plan_dir, analysis_dir, etc.) into the command line using .replace().
  • Risk: If a user provides an intent containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, $(...), &&), or if an artifact generated by a previous skill is tampered with, it could lead to the execution of arbitrary commands when spawn_agents_on_csv processes the wave.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it consumes and acts upon data generated by other tools/skills in the pipeline.
  • Ingestion points: File artifacts such as .workflow/.analysis/ANL-*/conclusions.json, .workflow/active/WFS-*/workflow-session.json, and .workflow/.lite-plan/*/plan.json are read and their contents (e.g., gaps, phase, task_count) are used to construct subsequent commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to spawn_agents_on_csv, Bash, Write, and Edit, allowing it to perform significant system operations.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions passed to sub-agents (WAVE_INSTRUCTION) lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the parameters of the skill_call.
  • Sanitization: While the skill performs basic CSV escaping (doubling quotes), it does not sanitize the logical content of the strings being placed into executable contexts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 5, 2026, 04:03 AM