project-documentation-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A shell command injection vulnerability exists in
SKILL.mdwithin the 'Phase 0: Dynamic Task Decomposition' section. The script extracts the user-provided project path or description from command-line arguments and stores it in therequirementvariable. This variable is then directly interpolated into a command string executed via theBashtool:ccw cli -p "... PROJECT TO ANALYZE: ${requirement}" .... An attacker can manipulate the shell execution environment by providing a requirement string containing shell metacharacters such as double quotes followed by;,&, or|to execute arbitrary commands with the agent's privileges. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8), as its core function is to process untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from the entire project structure using the
@**/*context inSKILL.mdand specific file scopes ininstructions/agent-instruction.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions use Markdown headers to separate context, but they lack explicit boundary markers or instructions to disregard directives found within the analyzed project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including directory and file creation (
Bash,Write), file reading (Read), and the ability to spawn additional agents (spawn_agents_on_csv). - Sanitization: There is no logic present to sanitize or escape project content before it is passed to the analysis tools or used to generate task descriptions for subsequent waves.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata