skill-tuning

Fail

Audited by Socket on Mar 5, 2026

3 alerts found:

Anomalyx2Obfuscated File
AnomalyLOW
phases/actions/action-init.md

This code implements a benign orchestration initializer but contains an unsafe pattern: direct interpolation of user/caller-supplied paths into Bash()-invoked shell commands. That leads to a realistic risk of command injection, path traversal, and unintended filesystem access. There is no evidence of explicit malware (no network exfiltration, no obfuscated payloads, no hardcoded credentials), but the unsafe shell use makes this module a security hazard if inputs are untrusted or controlled by an attacker.

Confidence: 90%Severity: 60%
Obfuscated FileHIGH
phases/orchestrator.md

The code fragment is functionally benign by itself (no obfuscated payloads, hardcoded credentials, or explicit network endpoints). However it creates a significant supply-chain and privilege-escalation risk: it grants an external 'universal-executor' Task both visibility of local state (via prompt and explicit path) and the ability to persist arbitrary state updates back to disk without validation. This two-way trust boundary enables credential or secret exfiltration, persistent tampering of workflow behavior, and other abuse if Task or action prompt files are compromised. Recommended actions: remove or avoid giving direct file paths in prompts; restrict Task capabilities (sandbox, deny file/network access unless explicitly allowed), validate and schema-check all stateUpdates before persisting, integrity-protect action prompt files, use atomic file writes and file locking, and redact secrets from stateKeyInfo. Treat this as a moderate-to-high security risk in a supply-chain context.

Confidence: 98%
AnomalyLOW
phases/actions/action-gemini-analysis.md

No explicit malicious code is present in this module itself — it is an orchestration wrapper that constructs prompts and runs an external CLI. The primary security concern is unsafe shell command construction using user-controlled inputs (insufficient escaping) and delegation to an external CLI run in background, which can lead to command injection or unintended data exfiltration if inputs are malicious or if the CLI is compromised. Treat this package as functionally benign but moderately risky without remediation of the command construction and input handling.

Confidence: 88%Severity: 62%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Mar 5, 2026, 12:19 PM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/catlog22%2Fclaude-code-workflow%2Fskill-tuning%2F@589a981147a1751827eb0c195919afd884a8707b