software-manual

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill downloads third-party libraries (marked.js, highlight.js) from unpkg.com using curl as specified in scripts/bundle-libraries.md. It also triggers downloads of documentation tools like pdoc and typedoc-plugin-markdown from public registries.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill frequently uses the Bash tool and subprocess.run to execute shell commands for environment setup and document generation. Evidence includes npm install, pip install, and starting the local development server (npm run dev) for automated screenshots in phases/04-screenshot-capture.md.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The script scripts/extract_apis.py uses dynamic imports to load the user's backend application code (e.g., from app.main import app) to generate OpenAPI schemas. This allows arbitrary code from the project being documented to run in the agent's context.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): This skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted source code and metadata from the local project directory and interpolates it into prompts for the universal-executor and cli-explore-agent sub-agents.
  • Ingestion points: Files like package.json, README.md, and source files under src/** are read in phases/03-parallel-analysis.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates.
  • Capability inventory: Sub-agents have the ability to read and write files to the disk and potentially execute code via the shell.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of external project content before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:02 PM