team-brainstorm

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool for routine directory and file management.
  • Evidence: In roles/coordinator/role.md, the coordinator executes Bash("mkdir -p ...") to initialize the session folder structure. This is a legitimate use for managing local workspace artifacts.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to prevent execution based on stale context, which is a safety best practice.
  • Evidence: The SKILL.md defines a "COMPACT PROTECTION" rule requiring the coordinator to reload role files if context compression occurs, ensuring it does not operate on incomplete instructions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to the nature of its multi-step agent pipeline.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the workflow via the user-provided topic description in Phase 1 and is subsequently passed between worker agents (e.g., ideator output is read by challenger).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions in role-specs/ (e.g., ideator.md, challenger.md) lack explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested data as untrusted content, making agents susceptible to instructions embedded within the brainstorming topic.
  • Capability inventory: Agents involved in the pipeline have access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, Edit, and Agent (for spawning sub-agents).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or output sanitization performed on the brainstorming data before it is processed by the next agent in the chain.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 8, 2026, 04:06 PM