wf-composer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes natural language input to generate execution templates, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. A malicious description could potentially be parsed into a template containing dangerous commands or deceptive instructions for downstream agents.
- Ingestion points: User-provided workflow description via the skill arguments.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit boundary markers or directives to ignore instructions embedded within the user's description during parsing.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Agent, and various file manipulation tools. The generated templates can invoke any executor in the Node Catalog, including shell commands and sub-agents. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or output validation for the generated
args_templatestrings, though the user review step acts as a manual filter. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to manage session files and template directories (e.g., creating.workflow/templates/). While these operations are functional, they utilize a high-privilege tool to perform file system modifications based on processed user input (slugs derived from descriptions).
Audit Metadata