workflow-execute
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted data and interpolates it into prompts for sub-agents and LLM analysis tools.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads implementation plans (
IMPL_PLAN.md), task definitions (.task/*.json), and task summaries (.summaries/*.md). - Boundary markers: The
Agentprompt template uses headers like 'Input:', 'Output Location:', and 'Execution:', which provide some structure but may not prevent an LLM from obeying instructions embedded in the variable data. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Agent(launching sub-agents),Write, andEdit. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the task titles (
{task.title}) or summary content before they are injected into the agent's prompt or theccw clianalysis commands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform legitimate workflow management tasks. - Evidence: It executes commands such as
jqfor JSON manipulation,findfor session discovery, andgitfor automatic commits of implemented tasks. - Evidence: In Phase 6, it uses
rg(ripgrep) to search for potential secrets and vulnerabilities as part of a defensive security review process.
Audit Metadata