workflow-test-fix-cycle

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an autonomous feedback loop that processes untrusted external data, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: In Phase 2, the cli-planning-agent reads .process/test-results.json and .process/test-output.log, which contain output from the execution of project tests.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts do not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the subagent from interpreting instructions that might be embedded within the test logs or failure reports.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the Bash, Edit, and Write tools, and can spawn further agents, granting it high impact if the planning agent is manipulated.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is present to clean the log data before it is analyzed by the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles shell commands using variables derived from the codebase, which can be exploited for command injection.
  • Evidence: The @test-fix-agent executes npm test -- ${affected_tests.join(' ')} where affected_tests is a list of files identified by an LLM.
  • Risk: If the project contains maliciously named files (e.g., using shell metacharacters like backticks or semicolons), these could be executed by the host shell during the test phase.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 12:14 AM