maestro-execute
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The session initialization logic is vulnerable to command injection. The variable
phaseArgis derived from$ARGUMENTSusing a regex that only removes specific flags, leaving shell metacharacters like;,&, or|intact. This variable is then interpolated into aBash()command for directory creation. - Evidence: The implementation uses
Bash("mkdir -p ${sessionFolder}")wheresessionFolderis constructed using the unsanitizedphaseArgfrom user input. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Shared Discovery Board Protocol' instructs agents to use a shell
echocommand to append JSON data to a file. This creates a secondary injection risk if the data being logged contains single quotes or other shell metacharacters. - Evidence: The protocol documentation explicitly suggests the use of
echo '...JSON...' >> {file}. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by reading task definitions from local files and passing them to sub-agents without boundary markers or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Reading task details from
.workflow/phases/{phase}/plan.jsonand.task/TASK-*.json. - Boundary markers: Absent. Instructions and data are passed directly to
spawn_agents_on_csv. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents have access to sensitive tools including
Bash,Write, andEdit. - Sanitization: None detected for the task content (description, hints, convergence criteria) before it is used to instruct executor agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata