maestro-overlay
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to modify the system instructions of other commands in
.claude/commands/*.mdbased on natural language intent. This establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious input could persistently alter the agent's behavior or safety constraints in subsequent sessions. - Ingestion points: User-provided intent in
SKILL.mdarguments. - Boundary markers: Injected blocks use hashed HTML-comment markers.
- Capability inventory:
Bashtool for executingmaestrocommands;Writetool for creating patch files in~/.maestro/overlays/. - Sanitization: No content validation or escaping is described for the natural language content being injected into system files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
maestroCLI tool viafunctions.exec_command. Parameters such as<name>in the--removeflag are derived directly from user input without explicit sanitization, creating a potential risk for command injection if the user provides shell-sensitive characters.
Audit Metadata