maestro-plan
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to create directories based on a session ID derived from user arguments. The variablephaseArgis constructed by removing specific flags from$ARGUMENTSbut does not sanitize for shell metacharacters like;,&,|, or backticks. A malicious input like"3; rm -rf /"would result in aBashcall executing arbitrary commands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the codebase to drive planning decisions.
- Ingestion points: Reads contents from
context.md,index.json,issues.jsonl, and codebase documentation (as described in Phase 1 context loading logic inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to high-privilege tools including
Bash,Write, andspawn_agents_on_csvwhich can be used to execute the resulting (potentially poisoned) plan. - Sanitization: Absent; the content of external files is directly interpolated into instructions for the planning sub-agents without validation or escaping.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata