quality-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs a directory path using the
phaseArgvariable, which is derived from the$ARGUMENTSinput without sufficient sanitization. This variable is then used in aBashcommand:Bash("mkdir -p ${sessionFolder}"). An attacker could inject shell metacharacters (such as;,&&, or backticks) into the arguments to execute arbitrary commands on the system.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection during its multi-wave review process. Findings from independent dimension agents are collected and interpolated into theprev_contextfor the aggregation agent in Wave 2. Malicious content within the files being reviewed or the task summaries could potentially manipulate the aggregator's verdict or downstream actions. Mandatory Evidence Chain:\n - Ingestion points: Reads project files, task summaries (
.task/TASK-*.json), and findings from dimension agents (viatasks.csvandwave-1-results.csv).\n - Boundary markers: None identified in the instruction construction logic or CSV schema.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes
Bash,Write,Edit, andspawn_agents_on_csv.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping or validating external findings before they are used to build instructions for the next wave of agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata