permissions
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses sensitive security configuration files.
- Evidence: Reads and writes
~/.claude/permissions.mdand~/macfair/files/claude/settings.json. - Impact: Exposure of the agent's permission model and internal configuration.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill facilitates the modification of its own authorized capabilities.
- Evidence: Programmatically updates the
permissions.allowarray insettings.jsonbased on the triage process, allowing the agent to expand its own attack surface. - Risk: An attacker could influence the agent to prompt the user to allow malicious tools or patterns.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerability to indirect prompt injection from the triage source file.
- Ingestion points:
~/.claude/permissions.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters when presenting undecided entries to the user.
- Capability inventory: File-read, File-write (
settings.json). - Sanitization: Absent; tool descriptions and metadata are presented to the user without filtering.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the user to execute a manual deployment step.
- Evidence: Instructions tell the user to run
make claudeto deploy the new permission settings.
Audit Metadata