meeting-recorder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
setup.shscript performs administrative tasks including installing system packages viaapt-get, modifying file permissions withchmod, and managing services withdocker compose. The skill also executeschrome-a11yfor browser interaction and PulseAudio utilities (pactl,parecord) for audio management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During initial setup, the skill downloads system dependencies from official repositories and Python packages (
requests,websockets,aiofiles) from the standard registry. It also pulls the Speaches transcription server image from the GitHub Container Registry (ghcr.io). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from meeting audio.
- Ingestion points: Meeting audio is transcribed and saved to
/tmp/meetings/<id>/transcript.txtand/tmp/meetings/<id>/mentions.txt(managed inscripts/meeting-recorder-setup/meeting-transcriber-batch.py). - Boundary markers: The transcribed text is stored as raw strings without delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to browser automation tools (
chrome-a11y) and a chat function to interact with meeting participants. - Sanitization: There is no validation or filtering performed on the transcribed speech before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata