auto-trigger
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an orchestration layer where context data is passed between skills using template variables such as
{feature_name},{prd_file}, and{pr_title}. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data (e.g., PR titles or feature names generated by other processes) is interpolated into trigger contexts defined in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The configuration does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat these variables as untrusted input.
- Capability inventory: Triggered skills identified in the documentation, such as
self-improving-agentandcreate-pr, possess high-privilege capabilities includingBashexecution,Write, andWebSearchtools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation mechanisms are described to ensure that data passed through these hooks does not contain malicious instructions that could influence the receiving skill's behavior.
Audit Metadata