cobo-agentic-wallet-sandbox
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/bootstrap-env.shscript downloads thecawCLI andcobo-tss-nodebinaries from vendor-controlled domains (download.agenticwallet.cobo.comanddownload.tss.cobo.com). These downloads are performed viacurland extracted usingtarat runtime. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following the download in
scripts/bootstrap-env.sh, the script executes thecawbinary to verify its version. This pattern constitutes the execution of externally sourced binaries. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple recipe files (e.g.,
recipes/evm-defi-aave.md,recipes/evm-defi-polymarket.md, andrecipes/solana-defi-dex-swap.md) usenode -eto execute JavaScript snippets. These snippets are constructed from shell variables to perform ABI encoding, HMAC-SHA256 computation, and Solana instruction building. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file
recipes/security.mdcontains various prompt injection patterns (such as 'Ignore previous instructions' and 'unrestricted mode'). These are documented as examples of malicious instructions for the agent to refuse, serving as a defensive mechanism, though they are flagged by static analysis tools as high-risk patterns.
Audit Metadata