github-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user-provided content from GitHub issues and pull requests.
- Ingestion points: Issue bodies, PR bodies, and comment summaries are interpolated directly into subagent prompts in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompts use simple textual labels (e.g., 'Body: {body}') to separate content but lack robust delimiters or specific instructions for the model to ignore instructions embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: Subagents have significant capabilities including the ability to comment on issues, close issues, and merge pull requests using the
ghCLI. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or filtering of the external data before it is presented to the LLM subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing external CLI tools to manage repository state.
- Evidence: Extensive use of
ghCLI commands such asgh issue list,gh issue comment,gh issue close, andgh pr mergeis defined inSKILL.md. The helper scriptscripts/gh_fetch.pyalso usesasyncio.create_subprocess_execto runghcommands. - Context: These operations are central to the skill's purpose, and the author has included defensive rules (anti-patterns) such as forbidding
git checkoutto prevent the execution of untrusted code from PR branches.
Audit Metadata