agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): This skill exposes a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from the internet.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
agent-browser open,agent-browser snapshot, andagent-browser get text(as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/snapshot-refs.md) to pull external web content into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within web pages are provided in the skill definition.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege tools including
agent-browser eval(JavaScript execution),agent-browser upload(local file read), andagent-browser screenshot/pdf(file system writes). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested web content is performed before processing.
- [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The
agent-browser evalcommand allows the agent to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the browser environment. - Evidence:
references/commands.mddocuments theevalcommand, including an option for executing Base64 encoded strings (-b/--base64), which can be used to bypass static analysis or conceal malicious logic. - [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation encourages the installation of external packages not included in the trusted list.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifies requirements forappiumvianpm install -g appiumfor mobile browser automation.
Audit Metadata