pay-for-service

[Skill Scanner] Backtick command substitution detected All findings: [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] The skill/documentation legitimately facilitates making paid x402 API requests and automatically paying in USDC via the 'awal' CLI. The main security concerns are supply-chain risk (unpinning @latest with npx), high-impact privileges required (wallet signing / on-chain transfers), and lack of transparency about whether request payloads are proxied to the awal backend. I did not find explicit malicious code or hardcoded secrets in the provided file, but the download-and-execute plus payment capabilities create a realistic risk of fund loss or data exposure if the CLI or its dependencies are compromised. Recommended mitigations: pin to a specific vetted version, require explicit interactive confirmation before payments, document backend endpoints and telemetry/data retention, add a dry-run mode that reveals payment destinations and amounts, and limit default max-amounts or require explicit --confirm when spending > a threshold. LLM verification: This SKILL.md is a legitimate documentation file for invoking a CLI that performs paid x402 requests, but it instructs running an unpinned remote package via 'npx awal@latest' and requires wallet authentication and on-chain USDC payments. The documentation contains no explicit malicious code, but the operational pattern (runtime package fetch + wallet/fund handling) creates a meaningful supply-chain and asset-theft risk. Recommend pinning versions, adding integrity checks/signing, clarifying whe