gpt-image-2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes a library of over 80 structured templates that interpolate user-provided text to form final image generation prompts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious input could influence the generated prompt.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied strings via
--promptand--promptfilearguments ingenerate.jsandedit.js. - Boundary markers: Absent. Inputs are directly interpolated into template strings.
- Capability inventory: Network access (
fetch) and file system write (writeFile) are utilized across the execution scripts. - Sanitization: Prompt text is trimmed but not escaped; filenames generated from prompts are sanitized via a
slugifyfunction. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches binary image data from remote URLs returned by the configured image generation gateway.
- Evidence: The
fetchBytesFromUrlfunction inscripts/shared.jsdownloads data from URLs provided in the API response. This is standard behavior for OpenAI-compatible image APIs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local configuration files, including those in the user's home directory, to retrieve API keys and endpoint settings.
- Evidence:
scripts/shared.jsautomatically loads environment variables from.env,.gateway.env, and~/.gateway.env. While used for legitimate configuration, this involves accessing sensitive file paths.
Audit Metadata