Stacked PR Management
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill processes external data from GitHub Pull Requests which acts as an untrusted ingestion point.
- Ingestion points:
gh pr viewandgh pr createretrieve data such as branch names, titles, and body content from the GitHub API. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in PR metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant 'write' capabilities, including
git push --force-with-lease,git rebase, andgh pr merge(found inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent. While shell variables are quoted to prevent simple shell injection, there is no logic to sanitize or validate the intent of the data retrieved from the external PRs before the agent acts upon it.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill performs automated branch manipulation and repository state changes based on the output of external CLI tools.
- Evidence: The 'Stack Rebase' and 'Merge Stack' sections in
SKILL.mduse shell loops to automate sequences ofgit checkout,git rebase, andgit pushcommands. In an autonomous agent context, these operations carry high risk if the logic is successfully subverted via indirect injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata