github-workflows-ollama

This GitHub Actions workflow template is generally coherent with its stated purpose (CI for RAG, Ollama, and pgvector testing). However, it includes several supply-chain risk patterns that raise a non-trivial security concern: a download-and-execute step (curl | sh) to install Ollama, unpinned container tags (including :latest), and global installation of third-party CLI tooling (npm install -g pgpm). Example hard-coded credentials (PGPASSWORD: password) are present and could encourage insecure copying. These factors make the template moderately risky for direct use in production CI without mitigation: replace curl|sh with a pinned, verified installer or package, pin container/image and package versions, avoid global installs where possible, and use GitHub Secrets for credentials. Overall, I assess low probability of intentional malware in the provided text (no explicit exfiltration endpoints or obfuscated payloads), but medium security risk due to supply-chain and credential-handling patterns.