figma-illustration-import
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is susceptible to attacks where malicious Figma design metadata influences agent behavior. 1. Ingestion points: Design context and layer names via
mcp0_get_design_context(SKILL.md, Step 1). 2. Boundary markers: Absent; instructions imply direct usage of external strings. 3. Capability inventory: Shell command execution (mkdir,curl) and file-write operations for.tsxfiles (SKILL.md, Steps 2-3). 4. Sanitization: Absent; no filtering of<illustration-name>or design constants. An attacker can name layers with shell metacharacters or inject React code to compromise the local environment or the web application. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): Executes shell commands like
mkdirandcurlusing parameters derived from external Figma metadata, creating a significant command injection surface. - [External Downloads] (LOW): Downloads assets from
localhost:3845. Whilelocalhostis a whitelisted exfiltration target, it serves as the source of untrusted data processed by the higher-severity injection surfaces described above.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata