evalite
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the pattern of interpolating user-provided test data into scoring prompts. \n- Ingestion points: Test data enters the context via the
datafield inevalite()calls within.eval.tsfiles, as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/full-example.md. \n- Boundary markers: The LLM-as-judge example inreferences/llm-judge-example.mdemploys delimiters such as[BEGIN DATA]and string separators (************), which provide some isolation but are not foolproof. \n- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes a Vitest-based runner for code execution and makes network requests to LLM providers for task execution and scoring. \n- Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization or escaping of input data before it is embedded in the evaluation prompts. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes the use of CLI tools for setup and operation. \n- Evidence: Instructions include runningpnpm addfor installation andevaliteorevalite watchfor executing the evaluation suite. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external packages from the npm registry for its core functionality. \n- Evidence: Usage of common libraries such asevalite,vitest,autoevals, and@ai-sdk/openaiis required for the skill to operate.
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