Livestreaming to ATProtocol
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- DATA_EXFILTRATION (MEDIUM): The skill transmits agent internal state, including 'reasoning_message' and 'assistant_message' content, to an external PDS (Personal Data Server) on the ATProtocol network.
- Evidence:
httpx.postcalls to{PDS}/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.createRecordinreferences/livestream.pyandreferences/publish-response.py. - Risk: Internal 'reasoning' often contains raw data processed by the agent that regex-based redaction (defined in
REDACT_PATTERNS) may not capture, leading to potential exposure of private information to a public or semi-public feed. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill's documentation instructs the user to configure system hooks that execute Python scripts via shell commands.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdsetup section includes shell commands for hook execution:uv run python hooks/livestream.py. - CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (LOW): The scripts use a hardcoded absolute path to a
.envfile for loading sensitive ATProtocol and API credentials. - Evidence:
load_dotenv("/home/cameron/central/.env")found in both reference scripts.
Audit Metadata