wp-playground
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process external 'Blueprints' via the
blueprint-urlparameter and the--blueprintCLI flag. - Ingestion points:
https://playground.wordpress.net/?blueprint-url=...andnpx @wp-playground/cli server --blueprint=...(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. The agent is encouraged to fetch and apply these configurations directly.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides powerful execution steps including
runPHP(arbitrary PHP execution),wp-cli(WordPress command execution), andwriteFile(filesystem modification). - Sanitization: None. The skill executes the steps defined in the blueprint without validation or sandboxing within the host environment context.
- Dynamic Execution (HIGH): The blueprint format explicitly supports code execution steps.
- Evidence: The
runPHPstep (found inblueprints/base.jsonand documented inSKILL.md) allows raw PHP code to be executed. In an agentic context, an attacker providing a malicious blueprint could execute code that attempts to escape the WebAssembly sandbox or consume host resources. - External Downloads & RCE (MEDIUM): The skill instructions rely heavily on
npx @wp-playground/cli. - Evidence:
npxdownloads and executes the latest version of the package from the npm registry at runtime. While@wp-playground/cliis the official package, it is not within the defined 'Trusted Sources' scope, representing a runtime code execution risk if the package or its dependencies are compromised. - Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill requests the
Bashtool and provides commands for mounting local directories into the playground. - Evidence: Use of
--mount=/local/path:/var/www/...could be used to expose sensitive local files to the WordPress environment if the agent is tricked into mounting high-privilege paths.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata