cover-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes an external Python script to handle image uploads when the
--uploadflag is used. - Evidence: In
cover_generator.py, theupload_imagefunction usessubprocess.run([sys.executable, uploader_path, image_path])to execute a script located at../image-uploader/image_uploader.py. - Context: This is a standard mechanism for inter-skill communication. The use of a list for command arguments (rather than a shell string) prevents command injection vulnerabilities.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-supplied text for image generation.
- Ingestion points: The
titleandsubtitlearguments are accepted as input incover_generator.pyand rendered into the output image. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters are used for the text inputs as they are rendered as pixels rather than interpreted as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The script can write files to the local disk via
image.save()and execute a sibling Python script viasubprocess.run(). - Sanitization: Input is handled by the
argparselibrary and passed to the Pillow (PIL) library for font rendering. No shell interpolation occurs.
Audit Metadata