mail139
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Directory Traversal. The
save_attachmentfunction inmail139.pyuses the filename from the email header without sanitization to construct the destination path (output_dir / fn). An attacker could exploit this by sending an email with a maliciously crafted filename (e.g.,../../.bashrc) to overwrite arbitrary files on the system when the user or agent saves attachments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Deceptive Metadata. The skill's description in
SKILL.mdclaims support for any IMAP/SMTP provider and the ability to send emails, but the script is hardcoded for 139.com IMAP and contains no SMTP code. This misleading information could cause an agent to attempt unsupported operations or misjudge the tool's reliability. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill fetches and processes untrusted email content, creating a risk that malicious instructions in an email could influence the agent's behavior. Ingestion points: Email headers and bodies fetched from 139.com via IMAP. Boundary markers: None identified in the skill instructions. Capability inventory: File system access (write) and subprocess execution (invoking lynx for HTML rendering). Sanitization: The tool performs HTML-to-text conversion but does not filter the semantic content for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata