insight-skill-generator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and instructs the agent to execute bash scripts for tasks such as content deduplication and state management. For example,
examples/example-generated-skill/SKILL.mdcontains executable bash blocks that perform hash computation and file manipulation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation workflow in
workflow/phase-5-installation.mdexplicitly suggests usingsudoto resolve permission errors when installing generated skills to global directories like~/.claude/skills/. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted markdown data from the
docs/lessons-learned/directory to generate the logic and instructions for new skills. - Ingestion points: Markdown files are read from
docs/lessons-learned/**/*.mdin Phase 1 (workflow/phase-1-discovery.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings implemented when the agent processes the content of these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to the local file system (including
~/.claude/skills/) and execute shell commands as described in the generation and installation phases. - Sanitization: While the skill performs "quality filtering" based on actionable items, it lacks security-focused sanitization to prevent malicious instructions embedded in the source markdown from poisoning the output skill.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata