reflect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes
agent-transcripts/*.jsonlfiles, which contain untrusted user-supplied data and tool outputs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the transcript could attempt to influence the subagents' findings or the final skill edits. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdidentifies and reads transcript files; subagents receive either the transcript file path or a session digest. - Boundary markers: The reviewer and synthesizer prompts in the
references/directory include explicit instructions to treat the transcript as untrusted data and ignore any embedded directives. - Capability inventory: The skill uses shell commands, spawns subagents with full tool access, and delegates file modifications to secondary tools.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language instructions for the LLM to ignore injected content; no programmatic filtering of the transcript content for safety is described beyond these instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands (
ls) to locate transcript files within the workspace. This is a standard functional requirement for transcript processing. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and applies edits to other skills based on conversation analysis. This involves creating new executable instructions for the agent. This behavior is mitigated by a mandatory human-in-the-loop approval step before any changes are applied.
Audit Metadata