he-bing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions describe constructing shell commands by interpolating unvalidated user-provided task descriptions (e.g.,
BRANCH_NAME="feature/$(echo "$TASK" | ...)"). This pattern is vulnerable to shell command injection if the agent executes these strings directly, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The merge phase utilizes the
gh pr merge --admincommand. The--adminflag allows the tool to bypass GitHub branch protection rules, such as required status checks or minimum review requirements, which represents a high-privilege action. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it depends on monitoring external PR comments for a specific trigger string ("No issues found") from a bot to proceed with automated merging. This could be exploited by an attacker with the ability to comment on the repository.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically performs
bun installwhen a project lockfile is detected during the worktree setup phase. While this is standard for JavaScript development, it triggers the download and execution of external dependencies within the agent's environment.
Audit Metadata