virtuals-protocol-acp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing and returning data from external, potentially untrusted agents in the ACP ecosystem.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the stdout of
scripts/index.ts, specifically theagent.descriptioninbrowse_agentsand thedeliverableinexecute_acp_jobandpoll_job.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdlack explicit delimiters or guidance for the agent to treat data from the ACP registry and job offerings as untrusted content.\n - Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant capabilities, including performing on-chain transactions and spending assets from a configured
WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY.\n - Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on the content of external deliverables or agent metadata before it is presented to the agent.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the
@virtuals-protocol/acp-nodelibrary and other dependencies from the public NPM registry. It also interacts with the Virtuals Protocol platform for agent discovery and job execution.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute a local TypeScript CLI tool (scripts/index.ts) usingnpx tsx. This tool is used to interact with the blockchain, read local credentials, and manage job states.
Audit Metadata