text-to-speech
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The procedure instructs the agent to execute shell commands (e.g.,
say,espeak) by interpolating thetext_contentparameter directly into the command string. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection because shell metacharacters (such as;,|, or$()) within the user input could be used to execute unauthorized commands on the host machine.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from the user and uses it in potentially dangerous system calls without sanitization. * Ingestion points:text_contentparameter in SKILL.md. * Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the input as literal data only. * Capability inventory: The skill can invoke subprocesses likesay,espeak,spd-say,curl,afplay,mpv, andaplay. * Sanitization: Absent. The skill lacks logic to validate, escape, or sanitize the user-provided text.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill usescurlto fetch audio data from the official OpenAI API (api.openai.com) for high-quality speech synthesis. This is a reference to a well-known service used for the skill's primary functionality.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata