skills/dandcg/claude-skills/outlook/Gen Agent Trust Hub

outlook

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from email bodies, subjects, and calendar events. An attacker could send a malicious message that tricks the agent into misusing its capabilities. Ingestion points: scripts/outlook-mail.sh (read, inbox, and search commands) and scripts/outlook-calendar.sh (read and events commands). Boundary markers: Absent; untrusted content is presented to the agent context without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. Capability inventory: The skill can send emails, delete messages, modify calendar events, and read arbitrary local files to add as attachments via the attach command. Sanitization: Basic HTML tag stripping is performed via gsub, but the content is not sanitized for malicious instructional patterns.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A path traversal vulnerability exists in the download command of scripts/outlook-mail.sh. The script retrieves attachment filenames directly from the Microsoft Graph API response and uses them to construct local file paths without sanitizing for parent directory references (e.g., ..). A malicious email containing an attachment with a crafted name could overwrite sensitive user files, such as shell configuration or SSH keys, when the agent executes a download.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 03:37 PM