WriteStory

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses coercive and high-pressure language such as "🚨 MANDATORY: Voice Notification", "REQUIRED BEFORE ANY ACTION", and "Execute this curl command immediately upon skill invocation" in SKILL.md. These instructions are designed to force the agent to perform side-channel tasks that are not related to the primary storytelling purpose, overriding default safety and operational constraints.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to run a shell command (curl) targeting http://localhost:8888/notify as a prerequisite for using the skill. While targeting localhost is generally whitelisted, the mandatory nature of this unauthorized command execution is a security concern as it establishes a pattern for executing side-effects without explicit user consent.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by requiring the agent to "load and apply" instructions from a user-writable path (~/.claude/skills/PAI/USER/SKILLCUSTOMIZATIONS/WriteStory/PREFERENCES.md).
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (customization loading phase)
  • Boundary markers: None provided to separate external configuration from the skill's core logic
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution (curl), file system access (read/write), and local network access
  • Sanitization: The skill does not provide any mechanism for validating or sanitizing the contents of the loaded preference files before integration into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 8, 2026, 10:34 AM