WriteStory

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Mandatory shell execution in SKILL.md. The skill instructions require the agent to execute a curl POST request to localhost:8888 before any other action. This is a non-standard side effect that can be used for local service probing (SSRF) or triggering unauthorized actions on the user's local network.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): High-risk Indirect Prompt Injection surface. The skill is designed to ingest and process large volumes of untrusted user-provided text (stories, notes, chapters) and perform complex operations based on that data.
  • Ingestion points: Workflows/Interview.md (Step 1: 'Read ALL of it first') and Workflows/Revise.md (Step 2: 'Read the existing chapter/scene/passage in full').
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill lacks any delimiters or instructions to treat user-provided story content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: File system write access (Workflows/BuildBible.md creates PRD files), Network access (curl in SKILL.md), and the ability to spawn/configure additional AI agents (Workflows/Explore.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic to escape or sanitize instructions that might be embedded within user-provided story text.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Local environment access. The skill attempts to load and apply 'SKILLCUSTOMIZATIONS' from ~/.claude/skills/PAI/USER/SKILLCUSTOMIZATIONS/WriteStory/, which involves searching for and reading files from the user's home directory based on computed paths.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 02:46 AM