Xlsx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill directs the agent to 'Load Full PAI Context' by reading a local file
~/.claude/PAI/SKILL.md. This instruction forces the agent to access personal metadata including contact lists and voice IDs before performing tasks.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The requirement to read sensitive configuration files from a hidden local directory (~/.claude/) poses a risk of exposing private user data to the AI model's context.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Therecalc.pyscript generates a LibreOffice Basic macro and writes it to the local configuration directory (~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/...or~/.config/libreoffice/...). It then executes this macro, representing a pattern of dynamic code generation and execution.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes thesubprocess.runfunction to execute system binaries likesofficeand environment-specific timeout tools.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection when processing untrusted spreadsheet data. Evidence Chain:\n - Ingestion points:
pd.read_excelandload_workbook(SKILL.md)\n - Boundary markers: Not implemented\n
- Capability inventory:
recalc.py(command execution) andSKILL.md(file writes)\n - Sanitization: Not implemented
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata