skills-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts provided with the skill (
run_eval.py,run_loop.py,improve_description.py) utilize the Pythonsubprocessmodule to execute theclaudeCLI and other system tools (e.g.,lsofto manage local ports). These operations are part of the skill's intended functionality as an automated evaluation and optimization framework. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. It is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from
evals/evals.jsonandevals/trigger-eval.jsonand interpolate these strings directly into prompts for theclaudeCLI. - Ingestion points: Test prompts and trigger queries are read from the
evals/directory. - Boundary markers: The subagent prompt templates documented in
SKILL.md(Step 6a) lack explicit boundary markers or specific instructions for the model to ignore embedded malicious instructions within the test cases. - Capability inventory: The skill's scripts can execute arbitrary shell commands via
subprocess, access the filesystem, and start a local HTTP server. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is performed on the content of the
promptorqueryfields before they are passed to the model execution context. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
eval-viewer/viewer.htmlcomponent includes a script tag that loads thesheetjslibrary fromcdn.sheetjs.com. This is a well-known service used to provide spreadsheet rendering capabilities in the local review interface.
Audit Metadata