skills/datadrivenconstruction/ddc_skills_for_ai_agents_in_construction/ml-model-retrainer/Gen Agent Trust Hub
ml-model-retrainer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Python 'pickle' module to restore model states, which is inherently insecure.
- Evidence: The
load_modelmethod inSKILL.mdaccepts a file path and performspickle.load(f)on the file's contents. Deserializing untrusted data with pickle can result in arbitrary code execution on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file system operations using paths that are not properly validated or sandboxed.
- Evidence: The
save_modelandload_modelmethods inSKILL.mduse an externally providedpathparameter directly inopen(path, ...)calls. Without path sanitization, this could allow for path traversal or unauthorized access to system files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted data files.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes user-provided project data in Excel, CSV, and JSON formats as described in
instructions.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions are implemented to prevent the agent from interpreting content within these data files as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the filesystem and execute code via the pickle vulnerability identified in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: No data validation or sanitization is performed on the fields of the ingested data files before they enter the agent's context.
Audit Metadata