ops-deploy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system commands using
Bash, includingaws ecsfor infrastructure management,gh runfor CI/CD status, andjqfor data processing. It also runs a local binary${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/ops-infrato gather system health data. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly retrieves sensitive authentication tokens. It attempts to resolve
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_IDandVERCEL_TOKENby checking environment variables or executingdoppler secrets get. These credentials are used for legitimate API interactions but are brought into the agent's execution context. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to
api.vercel.comusingWebFetchas a fallback mechanism to retrieve deployment details. Vercel is a well-known service, and these requests are used for the skill's primary purpose. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection surface is present because the skill ingests and displays external data such as build logs, runtime logs, and CI/CD results. This data is controlled by external sources (GitHub Actions, AWS CloudWatch) and could theoretically contain instructions designed to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Deployment logs from AWS, GitHub Actions, and Vercel; repository configuration from
registry.json. - Boundary markers: None detected; logs are processed and rendered directly.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(shell execution),WebFetch(network access), andAgent/TeamCreate(sub-agent orchestration). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping log content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata