ops-gtm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted content from the local repository to populate prompts for research sub-agents.\n
- Ingestion points: Reads
README.md,package.json,pyproject.toml,Cargo.toml,go.mod,.planning/**/*.md, anddocs/**/*.md(SKILL.md, Runtime Context step 4).\n - Boundary markers: Missing. Content from these files is interpolated directly into research agent prompts (e.g., for
paid-researchandunpaid-research) without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded instructions.\n - Capability inventory: Executes shell commands via
Bash, writes files to the plugin data directory, and invokes other skills using theSkilltool.\n - Sanitization: No evidence of content escaping, validation, or filtering of the scanned file content before prompt interpolation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
Bashto perform repository analysis (e.g.,git remote -v,cat README.md) and to manage its internal preferences viajq. These operations are restricted to the current working directory and the skill's specific data directory, presenting a localized and expected capability for its stated purpose.
Audit Metadata