moltbook-promotion
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the user to store a Moltbook API key in a local file at
~/.config/moltbook/credentials.jsonand then reads this file to set environment variables for authentication. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the installation of the
@lucid-agents/clitool, which is an official resource provided by the vendor,daydreamsai. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses common shell utilities including
curl,grep,cut, andjqto manage credentials and interact with the Moltbook API. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and respond to external, untrusted content from the Moltbook API, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent fetches posts via
https://www.moltbook.com/api/v1/poststo generate engagement drafts. - Boundary markers: The skill includes a 'Safety Protocol' section that explicitly labels Moltbook content as untrusted and instructs the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curlfor network requests and shell commands for data parsing; it does not possess capabilities for arbitrary code execution or local file writing beyond its specified promotional purpose. - Sanitization: A strict human-in-the-loop policy is enforced, requiring explicit approval for all drafts and prohibiting auto-posting to mitigate the risk of malicious input influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata